Isaac Newton’s third law of motion – for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction – seems to apply everywhere but to Israel, at least judging by the shock and dismay displayed in the wake of its recent moves.
How else can one explain the international uproar over Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich’s announcement of construction plans in the E1 corridor linking Jerusalem and Ma’aleh Adumim, France’s protests over reports its Jerusalem consulate may be closed if Paris recognizes a Palestinian state, or Australia’s outrage after Israel revoked visas for its representatives to the Palestinian Authority following its decision to bar MK Simcha Rothman from visiting the Jewish community there?
It is as if the world believes it can take steps that Israel views as profoundly inimical to its interests, such as a recognition of a Palestinian state, and that Jerusalem will acquiesce without responding. It is as if Israel has no agency of its own.
For almost three decades, various Israeli governments have pledged to build in E1, but ultimately refrained, fearing diplomatic fallout from countries arguing that such construction would prevent the establishment of a future Palestinian state by blocking territorial contiguity from Ramallah to Bethlehem. And what might that fallout have been? It may have been the recognition of a Palestinian state by key Western countries, arms embargoes, and the cancellation of participation in prestigious programs.
But if those things are currently happening anyway, regardless of whether Israel touches E1, then why not go ahead and build there now? Why not, in effect, respond to announced plans by France, the UK (under certain conditions), Canada, and Australia to recognize a Palestinian state by moving forward with measures on the ground that Israel believes will strengthen its hand and prevent the establishment of a state it sees as a danger to its existence?
The idea of establishing a Palestinian state in Judea and Samaria, which would effectively turn the center of the country into a Gaza-envelope-like area, is one that a majority of Israelis once entertained, but no longer. The Second Intifada disabused many of that notion, and Hamas’s October 7 massacre buried it even deeper.
Yet many Europeans think differently. Indeed, after October 7 – mainly because of it – they want to move forward with Palestinian statehood. French Ambassador Frédéric Journès made that clear in an Army Radio interview on Tuesday, arguing that this was in Israel’s own interest, because only with a Palestinian state as the end game would Arab countries agree to help reconstruct Gaza after the war.
Palestinian statehood an existential threat in most Israelis' eyes
But the government, and most Israelis, see such a state not as a solution but as an existential threat, even though Journès insisted that such a state would be “small” and demilitarized, with a deradicalized school curriculum, committed to living in peace with Israel.
Here is what Israelis hear when someone says this:
Who is going to guarantee this? France?
And what if this “small” Palestinian state turns into Gaza, which was, for all intents and purposes, already a “small” Palestinian state? Who will pay the price of a mistaken gamble? French citizens?
Israelis have seen what the Palestinians did with the territory handed over to them in Gaza. To expect Israel to embrace another Palestinian state after October 7 is to ignore both history and what Israel has experienced since the 1993 and 1995 Oslo Accords. And if European countries insist on pressing that agenda, they must also expect Israel to push back, which is precisely what is happening.
Plans for E1 resurfaced last week, and, predictably, global condemnations followed. Noticeably, however, they did not emanate from the United States.
Still, this was to be expected. If the West tries to impose a Palestinian state on Israel, it should be no surprise if Jerusalem counters by strengthening its hold on critical territory. As Newton taught, every action triggers an equal and opposite reaction.
And E1 is not the only case in point. Israel Hayom reported that the government is also weighing closing the Consulate General of France in Jerusalem, which serves Palestinians, in response to France’s decision to recognize a Palestinian state. Notably, the UK, Canada, and Australia quickly followed France’s move.
Journès responded on Army Radio that closing the consulate would trigger an adverse reaction in Paris, though he did not specify what form that might take. He stressed that the consulate is deeply symbolic for France, having been established even before the founding of Israel. “France is a country that is sensitive to symbols,” he said, adding pointedly, “we won’t like it, that’s for sure.”
As if France were the only country “sensitive to symbols.”
Paris’s recognition of a Palestinian state is itself nothing but a symbolic gesture, one that changes nothing on the ground. Israel could rightly respond that it, too, is sensitive to symbols, especially those it interprets as threatening the lives of its citizens.
And then there is Australia.
It remains unclear what Canberra thought would happen when, in the space of a week, it declared it, too, would recognize, a Palestinian state and revoked the visa of MK Simcha Rothman because of his affiliation with the Religious Zionist Party and its policies, which call for Hamas’s elimination and Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria.
Either the Australians assumed Israel would not respond – again believing that somehow Newton’s law doesn’t apply to Israel – or they did not care.
Yet they do care. One of Israel’s responses was to revoke the visas of Australian representatives to the PA, something that drew the ire of Foreign Minister Penny Wong, who accused the Netanyahu government of isolating Israel and “undermining international efforts towards peace and a two-state solution.”
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu shot back on social media with an uncharacteristically scathing attack on Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in the type of personal broadside usually reserved for leaders like Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
“History will remember Albanese for what he is: a weak politician who betrayed Israel and abandoned Australia’s Jews,” Netanyahu posted on X/Twitter.
None of this, obviously, will topple Australia. But it is difficult to see how Canberra’s steps, and the backlash it risks, including in Washington, serve Australian interests. These steps do not serve Israel’s interests either, but they certainly do not serve Australia’s. One explanation is that Canberra did not anticipate such a strong Israeli reaction.
True, these Israeli countermeasures are unlikely to change the policies of those countries. Yet they may give other governments pause before taking similar steps, if only out of concern that their own interests with Israel might be damaged.
Israel today is not the Israel of 1955, 1975, or even 2005. Then, its relationship with Europe and other Western democracies was often one-directional: countries gave, Israel received. Today, Israel also provides.
Can those countries get along without cooperation with Israel? Yes, but not as easily. France wants a consulate in Jerusalem. It can only have one if Israel allows it. The Australians, too, need Israel’s cooperation for their diplomatic work. And all of them want to prevent Jerusalem from blocking Palestinian statehood.
Yet when these same countries take unilateral steps that Jerusalem sees as undermining its core interests, they weaken their own leverage. In that situation, the government can reasonably conclude that if it will be condemned regardless, it might act in ways it deems vital, such as building in E1, since the backlash has already landed.
If others choose to press Israel, they should not be surprised when Israel pushes back – hard.
No comments:
Post a Comment